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I. INTRODUCTION
In a five-four decision written by Justice O'Connor, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin that a judicial
determination of probable cause for a warrantless arrest must be made
within forty-eight hours of the arrest, including weekends and holidays.,
Three dissenters, led by Justice Marshall, would have affirmed the lower
courts' decisions that thirty-six hours was an appropriate outside time
limit. Justice Scalia took the most stringent stance, arguing that twenty-
four hours should be the outside constitutional limit for a determination
of probable cause in a warrantless arrest situation.
Riverside is an excellent example of the difficulty involved in for-
mulating a bright line test. The three suggested time limits set forth by
the justices are each separated by only twelve hours. As this casenote
will reveal, however, Justice Scalia's opinion was the soundest approach;
the fourth amendment as interpreted by a prior United States Supreme
Court opinion, Gerstein v. Pugh,2 requires a twenty-four hour outside
time limit for the determination of probable cause in a warrantless
arrest.
In presenting the analysis which leads to this conclusion, Section II
will trace the law prior to and prompting Riverside. Section III will
discuss the facts and holding of Riverside. Section IV will present an
analysis of Riverside and explain the problems with its outcome. Finally,
Section V will recommend procedures that Louisiana and other states
should implement in light of Riverside and this writer's conclusions.
II. BACKGROUND LAW
The fourth amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that, "no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
Copyright 1992, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991).
2. 420 U.S. 103, 95 S. Ct. 854 (1975).
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affirmation. . . .", One aspect of the requirement of probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation is that the existence of probable cause
must be determined by a "neutral and detached magistrate." '4 The reason
for this requirement is as follows:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the
support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from
evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences
be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime.'
The fourth amendment, however, does not require that a warrant
always be issued prior to arrest.6 Rather, the validity of a warrantless
arrest depends on whether probable cause existed at the time of arrest.'
Therefore, the question arises as to whether or not the fourth
amendment requires a separate determination of probable cause by a
"neutral and detached magistrate" in cases of warrantless arrests. If
such a determination is required,, how soon after a warrantless arrest
must that determination be made?
In Gerstein v. Pugh, the Court held that a suspect arrested without
a warrant is entitled to a "fair and reliable determination of probable
cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and
this determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or
promptly after arrest."8
Recognizing that the states have an interest in protecting public
safety and that an individual has an interest in avoiding pretrial con-
finement on anything less than probable cause, the Gerstein Court found
the requirement of a "prompt" determination to be a "practical com-
promise." 9 The Court emphasized that the consequences of prolonged
detention may be more serious than the consequences of arrest. For
3. U.S. Const. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af.
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized. (emphasis added).
4. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350, 92 S. Ct. 2119, 2123 (1972);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2029 (1971).
5. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369 (1948).
6. U.S. v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S. Ct. 820 (1976).
7. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S. Ct. 223, 225 (1964).
8. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125, 95 S. Ct. 854, 868.69 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 113, 95 S. Ct. at 863.
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instance, a person's family relations, employment and reputation could
be severely harmed by an unjustified detention. 0
In articulating the type of probable cause determination required,
the Court stated,
The standard is the same as that for arrest. That standard-
probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime-
traditionally has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary
proceeding on hearsay and written testimony, and the Court has
approved these informal modes of proof."
Furthermore, "adversar[ial] safeguards are not essential.. ."' How-
ever, the Court declared that "desirability of flexibility and experimen-
tation by the States" allows the combining of the probable cause
determination with other pretrial procedures in which adversarial safe-
guards do exist.' 3 Therefore, states may determine the existence of prob-
able cause at presentment or arraignment, upon appointment of counsel,
at the hearing to set bail, or during any other pretrial procedure a state
may already have in existence, as long as the probable cause determi-
nation is prompt.' 4
The Gerstein Court reasoned that combining the probable cause
determination with other procedures would be the least burdensome
requirement on an already overburdened criminal system." Furthermore,
the Court did not interpret the Constitution to be so rigid as to require
any particular procedure.'
However, the Gerstein decision itself soon burdened the. criminal
justice system with an onslaught of cases challenging state criminal
procedures as violations of Gerstein."7 Judges struggled with the meaning
of "prompt" and, finally, in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, some
sixteen years later, the Court attempted to resolve the issue.
I. FACTS AND HOLDING OF RIVERSIDE
Donald McLaughlin and others brought a class action suit alleging
that Riverside County's policy for probable cause determination was in
direct violation of Gerstein. The County's policy was to determine
10. Id. at 114, 95 S. Ct. at 863.
II. Id. at 120, 95 S. Ct. at 866.
12. Id. at 120, 95 S. Ct. at 866. Also, note that those adversarial safeguards not
required include "appointed counsel, confrontation, cross-examination and compulsory
process for witnesses." Id. at 119, 95 S. Ct. at 866.
13. Id. at 123. 95 S. Ct. at 868.
14. Id. at 123-25, 95 S. Ct. at 868.69.
15. Id. at 123-24, 95 S. Ct. at 868.
16. Id. at 123, 95 S. Ct. at 868.
17. See infra note 26.
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probable cause at the arraignment proceeding which was to be held
within two days of arrest, excluding weekends and holidays. As Justice
O'Connor pointed out in the majority opinion, if a person is arrested
during the Thanksgiving holiday, that person could be held as long as
seven days without any probable cause determination.'"
McLaughlin and his co-plaintiffs, sought to limit the time between
a warrantless arrest and a probable cause determination to thirty-six
hours. The district court granted that relief, and the appellate court
affirmed." Although the entire Supreme Court agreed that Riverside's
policy was contrary to the fourth amendment, the Court was divided
as to what would be an appropriate outside time limit.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, held that forty-eight
hours was a more appropriate time limit than the thirty-six hours sought
by the plaintiffs and granted by the lower courts. Justice O'Connor
declared this to be the balance struck between the interests of public
safety and the harm to a potentially innocent person. 20 She emphasized
the- increased administration costs that would result from a time limit
any shorter than forty-eight hours.2' She further pointed out that Gerstein
said that the Constitution "does not compel an immediate determination
of probable cause," but instead allowed the determination to be com-
bined with existing pretrial procedures. 22
In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stev-
ens, found Gerstein's requirement of "prompt" determination to mean
that such determination must be made immediately upon completion of
the administrative steps incident to arrest. 23 Because the lower courts
had found that thirty-six hours was more than ample time to complete
the administrative process, Justice Marshall's dissent advocated that the
decision should be affirmed. 4
Justice Scalia stressed the historical implications relied upon by the
Court in Gerstein," and agreed with Justice Marshall that the period
of warrantless detention should be limited to that time necessary to
18. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, II1 S. Ct. 1661, 1665.
19. Id. at 1666.
20. Id. at 1669.
21. Id. at 1670.
22. Id. at 1668.
23. The administrative steps include but are not limited to booking, photographing,
and fingerprinting the suspect. Id. at 1671.
24. Actually, the County had acknowledged that "nearly 90 percent of all cases ...
can be completed in 24 hours or less." Riverside, Ill S. Ct. 1676 n.3, citing Brief for
District Attorney, County of Riverside, at Amicus Curiae 16.
25. Id. at 1672, citing 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown 95 n.13 (lst Am. ed. 1847).
At common law, which formed the basis of the U.S. criminal justice system, a person
arresting a suspect without a warrant must deliver the arrestee to a magistrate "as soon
as he reasonably can."
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complete the administrative steps incident to arrest. Justice Scalia further
noted that only one federal court in interpreting Gerstein had ever held
that twenty-four hours was an inadequate amount of time to complete
post-arrest procedures. In fact, with the same exception, he noted that
every court facing the issue had selected twenty-four hours as an ap-
propriate time limit.26
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE RIVERSIDE DECISION
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, placed her greatest re-
liance on factors other than that upon which Gerstein relied. Justice
O'Connor placed great weight on the administrative costs associated with
a twenty-four hour time limit: "In advocating a 24-hour rule, the dissent
would compel Riverside County-and countless others across the Na-
tion-to speed up its criminal justice mechanisms substantially, presum-
ably by allotting local tax dollars to hire additional police officers and
magistrates."27
The possibility of increased administrative costs is certainly an im-
portant consideration. However, Justice O'Connor's reasoning unfor-
tunately de-emphasizes the importance of individual rights and assumes
that states must combine the determination of probable cause with
existing pretrial procedures in order to avoid any increase in adminis-
trative costs. Certainly, if the Constitution so compels, a separate pro-
cedure must be established, as the fourth amendment was designed to
protect persons against unlawful arrest and unjustified detention.
The Gerstein Court recognized the possible danger to an individual's
liberty resulting from delay of the probable cause determination as an
important factor in deciding that adversarial safeguards are unnecessary:
Criminal justice is already overburdened by the volume of cases
and the complexities of our system. The processing of misde-
26. Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 818
(1989) (because New York afforded adversarial protection, 72 hours was permissible
maximum length of detainment); Bernard v. City of Palo Alto, 699 F.2d 1023, 1025 (9th
Cir. 1983) (because no more than 8 to 10 hours was required to complete the administrative
steps incident to arrest, 24 hours was maximum detainment without presentment); Sanders
v. City of Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694, 700 (S.D. Tex. 1982), aff'd without opinion, 741
F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1984) (24 hours was all that was necessary to complete the "proper"
administrative steps); Lively v. Cullinane, 451 F. Supp. 1000, 1005 (D.D.C. 1978) (those
steps necessitated by "substantial administrative need" only required 1 1/2 hours); Dommer
v. Hatcher, 427 F. Supp. 1040 (N.D. Ind. 1975), rev'd in part, 653 F.2d 289 (7th Cir.
1981) (24 hours is maximum time of detainment unless Sunday or holiday intervenes, in
which case 48 hours is the maximum. The court did not make a determination as to the
length of time necessary to complete the administrative steps.). See also Gramenos v. Jew
Companies, Inc., 797 F.2d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 1986) (an exact time limit was not decided,
but a four hour delay after completion of administrative steps "requires explanation").
27. 111 S. Ct at 1670.
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meanors, in particular, and the early stages of prosecution gen-
erally are marked by delays that seriously affect the quality of
justice. A constitutional doctrine requiring adversary hearings
for all persons detained pending trial could exacerbate the prob-
lem of pretrial delay. 8
Thus, individual rights which mandate the need for immediacy in de-
termination, not administrative costs, were the reasons the Gerstein Court
held that the determination of probable cause must be "prompt."
Additionally, Justice O'Connor repeatedly emphasized the fact that
the Court, in Gerstein, allowed some flexibility.2 9 Thus, the determination
of probable cause could be combined with previously established pretrial
procedures. The Court in Gerstein "recognizeld] the desirability of flex-
ibility and experimentation by the States." 30 However, the Court did
not compel such combinations. Again, the Gerstein Court reasoned that
the combination of the probable cause determination with existing pro-
cedures might ease the burden on the criminal justice system. Given the
grave importance of individual rights recognized by the Gerstein Court,
it is hard to imagine that the Court in any way meant for this flexibility
to justify any delay between arrest and determination of probable cause.
When further considering the fact that the Court did not require ad-
versarial safeguards for fear that to do so would further delay the
system, it seems clear that the Gerstein Court intended that there be
"flexibility" in the nature of the hearing, not in the timing.
Therefore, Justice O'Connor's justification of a time limit greater
than that set by the lower courts based upon increased administrative
costs, flexibility, and combining procedures is clearly inconsistent with
the principal basis of Gerstein, individual liberty.
Justice O'Connor did not interpret Gerstein to require the deter-
mination of probable cause to be made immediately upon the completion
of the steps incident to arrest. She found such a requirement to be
inflexible.3" The Constitution, as she saw it, did not require a "rigid
procedural framework. '"32
The Gerstein Court clearly did not state that the Constitution compels
an immediate determination of probable cause after the arrest. However,
the Court did state that, "a policeman's on-the-scene assessment of
28. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122, 95 S. Ct. 854, 867 n.23 (emphasis added).
29. For example, Justice O'Connor stated that "[gliven that Gerstein permits juris-
dictions to incorporate probable cause determinations into other pretrial procedures, some
delays are inevitable." Riverside, III S. Ct. at 1669.
30. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 123, 95 S. Ct. at 868.
31. It is important to reiterate that the Court was split, 5-4, on whether or not
Gerstein meant that the determination of probable cause must be made immediately upon
the completion of the steps incident to arrest.
32. Riverside, 111 S. Ct. at 1668.
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probable cause provides legal justification for arresting a person sus-
pected of crime, and for a brief period of detention to take the ad-
ministrative steps incident to arrest."' 33 All but one federal court and
four out of the nine Justices on the Court in Riverside saw Gerstein
as requiring that the determination of probable cause be made imme-
diately upon the completion of the steps incident to arrest. When com-
bined with the importance Gerstein placed on timing, it seems clear that
the Gerstein Court meant for the determination of probable cause for
a non-warrant arrest to be made immediately following completion of
the steps incident to arrest.
Once more, it is necessary to reiterate that with one exception no
federal court has held that twenty-four hours is inadequate for the
completion of the steps incident to arrest.14 These courts, even Justice
O'Connor admitted, are certainly in a better position to make such an
inquiry and decision than is the more remote U.S. Supreme Court.3"
Because authority exists for the proposition that the Gerstein Court
intended for the determination of probable cause to occur immediately
upon completion of the steps incident to arrest and because an individual
in a criminal situation deserves the utmost constitutional protection, it
seems logical that twenty-four hours be the maximum period of de-
tainment before a determination of probable cause is made. 6
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Generally
Bright line tests are generally inflexible. As flexibility in U.S. Su-
preme Court decisions increases, however, states may. often dilute in-
dividual rights by following the "floor" of rights established by the
decision. Unfortunately, the most efficient way to ensure the constitu-
tionally demanded protection of individual liberty in the case of pretrial
detention is with a bright line test regarding the timing of the deter-
mination of probable cause.
The gravity of harm that could potentially be caused to the arrested
individual is great. An individual's family relations, job, and reputation
could be severely and unjustly damaged by a prolonged detention."
Therefore, the bright line should be drawn so as to allow the least
33. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113-14, 95 S. Ct. at 863 (emphasis added).
34. See supra note 26.
35. Riverside, 11l S. Ct. at 1670.
36. Incidentally, a 24 hour time limit is an effective deterrent which will prevent
police officers from further investigating a crime after the suspect is in custody in an
effort to establish probable cause where it did not otherwise exist at the time of arrest.
37. Gerstein at 114, 95 S. Ct. at 863.
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possible delay before the determination of probable cause is made. It
is no secret that our criminal justice system is extremely overburdened.
Any increase in that burden is an important consideration. However,
the fourth amendment is designed to protect individual rights, and every
effort should be made to maintain those protections. We cannot choose
to ignore the Constitution simply because it is costly to comply with it
in this instance.
Fortunately, there is a solution which would not be detrimental to
any of the factors articulated in the three opinions of Riverside, or in
Gerstein. This solution is arguably more consistent with Gerstein than
is Riverside's majority opinion: states should adopt warrant-like pro-
cedures for the determination of probable cause in a non-warrant arrest.
That is, procedures similar to those for obtaining a warrant could be
followed after the arrest is made.
First, a warrant-like procedure does not require the defendant's
presence. To require the defendant's presence would add practical dif-
ficulties, including problems with security, which would increase ad-
ministrative costs and delay the timing of the probable cause determination.
This is consistent with Gerstein, which did not require adversarial safe-
guards."8
Secondly, the Gerstein Court said "[tihe [probable cause] standard
is the same as that for arrest." 39 Warrant procedures are the standard
for arrest. Furthermore, warrant procedures would not greatly burden
the criminal justice system financially, nor would they create delays in
timing. Under Louisiana law, which, in this situation, is similar to that
of most other states, a warrant only requires that "[tihe person making
the complaint execute[] an affidavit specifying, to his best knowledge
and belief, the nature, date and place of the offense . . ." and present
the affidavit to any magistrate for his separate determination of the
existence of probable cause.'
.If a state has an established procedure that takes place within twenty-
four hours, then the probable cause determination may be made in
combination with that procedure. Alternatively, however, states should
implement a new, warrant-like procedure to determine probable cause
for a non-warrant arrest within twenty-four hours of arrest, including
weekends and holidays.
B. In Louisiana
Interestingly enough, Louisiana's Code of Criminal Procedure does
not include an article which addresses the determination of probable
38. Id. at 120, 95 S. Ct. at 866.
39. Id.
40. La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 202(1). See infra note 42.
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cause for a non-warrant arrest. Evidently, the procedure for such de-
termination has been left to individual jurisdictions despite the Gerstein
decision in 1975 which made a probable cause determination in a war-
rantless arrest a constitutionally mandated protection. Now, after Riv-
erside's imposition of time limits, the constitutional protections afforded
individuals are even greater. Without any code article to address these
issues, Louisiana and its individual jurisdictions leave themselves open
to litigation. 4'
Under current Louisiana law, the earliest judicial proceeding fol-
lowing arrest is to occur within seventy-two hours, excluding weekends
and holidays. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 230.1 gov-
erns the maximum time for appearance of the defendant before a judge
for the purposes of appointing counsel and setting bail. As mentioned
previously, because presentment of the defendant adds practical diffi-
culties, it would be administratively infeasible to amend this article so
as to require appointment of counsel and setting of bail to occur within
twenty-four hours of arrest. Therefore, Louisiana must adopt a new
warrant-like procedure to occur within twenty-four hours of a warrantless
arrest. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 202 governs pre-
arrest warrant procedure. A post-arrest procedure similar to this article
should be adopted to occur within twenty-four hours of arrest, excluding
weekends and holidays. 42
Alycia B. Olano
41. Even if the legislature were not to adopt the conclusions of this casenote, an
amendment to the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure is necessary, in light of Riverside,
to avoid lawsuits by creating uniformity amongst the various local jurisdictions.
42. La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 202 reads as follows:
A warrant of arrest may be issued by any magistrate, and, except where a
summons is issued under article 209, shall be issued when:
(!) The person making the complaint executes an affidavit specifying, to his
best knowledge and belief, the nature, date, and place of the offense, and the
name and surname of the-offender if known, and of the person injured if there
be any; and
(2) The magistrate has probable cause to believe that an offense was committed
and that the person against whom the complaint was made committed it.
(3) A justice of the peace shall not have the authority to issue a warrant for
the arrest of a peace officer for acts performed while in the course and scope
of his official duties.
When complaint is made before a magistrate of the commission of an offense
in another parish, the magistrate shall also immediately notify the district attorney
of the parish in which the offense is alleged to have been committed.
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